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Abstract 
The birth of the European idea finds its descendance from the negative 
consequences created by the catastrophic menace of the Second World War. 
The West European Union (WEU), founded in 1954 as Europe’s defensive 
arm against the German or the Soviet threat, proved more helpful in the 
cause for European integration rather than towards the aim of its inception. 
Nevertheless, as the forces of history worked their way, the WEU played a 
role of no lesser importance. According to this frame of thought the WEU 
functioned as the archetype on which the EU was based, supporting on vary-
ing levels of cooperation and actions in an effective manner the very cause of 
European integration. 
 
1. Introduction 
The birth of the European idea, as experienced nowadays in the contem-
porary European reality, finds its descendance from the negative conse-
quences created by the catastrophic menace of the Second World War (fi-
nancial problems, food shortage, low agricultural production, minimal indus-
trial production). In effect, the Second World War had catalytic conse-
quences on the preexisting nationalist aspirations of the European states and 
significantly contributed to the building up of Europe in parallel with the 
realization of the European vision. 
During the interwar period, two, initially contradictory, trends were for-
mulated, which, in turn, developed into a dialectic relation on the issue of the 
European integration: on the one hand, there was the federalist trend, the full 
realization of which would constitute the acceptance of a union based on the 
federalist state model (federal entity, unionist integration) and on the other, 
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there was the trend for common governance through an intergovernmental 
cooperation. These two trends, out of which the first functions in a centripe-
tal and the second in centrifugal fashion, have developed throughout history 
a dialectical relation, the outcome of which is nothing less than the current 
European reality. The preponderance of the one form over the other, how-
ever, would guide the European venture to a different orientation. Jacques 
Delors’ initial thought for the creation of a federation of nation states, found 
allies in the faces of Valery Giscard d’ Estaign and Helmut Schmidt, who 
took the initial idea one step further by proposing a federal approach for the 
eurozone in the European Union (EU) context. As of May 12, 2000, Joschka 
Fisher, was referring to the union using the term authentic federation. All of 
a sudden, Jean Monnet’s and Robert Schuman’s vision became of interest 
once again. It was restored, as one could well put it, by the decision makers 
mentioned above, in the context of the discussion of the course Europe 
should follow nowadays in order to base its future on solid foundations (Sid-
janski, 2002). Yet, the normative power of reality is the one to determine 
which model will prevail, as the several approaches towards the one or the 
other direction attempted by their respective proponents and the architects of 
the European venture, will come together in one final shape. This shape, to a 
great extent, will bear the characteristics of the prevailing trend, but will also 
bear –yet only suggestively- the elements of the trend that failed to prevail in 
the end. 
In any case, however, it is certain that in the dynamics of the EU integra-
tion experienced so far, there was a number of parameters which contributed 
to its formation, to a lesser or larger extent. The West European Union 
(WEU), founded in 1954 as Europe’s defensive arm against the German or 
the Soviet threat, proved more helpful in the cause for European integration 
rather than towards the aim of its inception. The WEU truly contributed to 
the realization of the European vision. It would have been almost impossible 
for the European states to move towards a political integration from the very 
beginning through a supranational entity, which would regulate the sensitive 
issue of defense. It was much too soon for such a development to happen, 
something that was actually proven with the rejection of the European De-
fense Community (EDC), which is mentioned further in the text. This diffi-
cult role on the intergovernmental level was carried out by the WEU. So, the 
European integration went forward untrammeled, in the field of the so-called 
low politics, that is, mainly in economic functions, based on a functional ap-
proach, which led to the creation of the initial unifying fields. (Haas, 1968, 
84, P. Ioakeimides,   1994, 24, Kouskouvelis, Poiotita Publications, 2004, 
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435). 1 Nowadays, the increased cooperation of the EU member states, start-
ing from the intergovernmental level, has already approached the suprana-
tional one, exhibiting increasing integration tendencies in other fields as well, 
both in broadness and intensity. 
In the current analysis, we will attempt to approach the issue of European 
integration through the analysis of the dialectical relation developed between 
the EU and the WEU. The evolution of the WEU, from its inception until its 
incorporation within the EU and the assessment of the contribution of the 
organization to the European integration, will be examined. We will, next, 
highlight the landmarks in the course of the WEU’s evolution that carried the 
European venture forward. 
2. The first step towards the creation of the WEU: The Dunkerk Agree-
ment, 1947 
The Dunkerk Agreement constitutes the first step, taken by both the 
Great Britain and France on March 4, 1947, in order to check the potential 
threat stemming from Western Germany. The agreement would function as a 
defense umbrella for the two states against the potential –but then improb-
able- case that the Western Germany attempted the revision of the treaties it 
had signed as the defeated power, as was the case in the First World War (K. 
Ioannou and G. Koumoutsakou, 1992, 11). Yet, the regulatory power of 
things has already started to compose a different jigsaw than the one 
sketched by the balances of the Second World War. A new threat, the Soviet 
Union, appeared in the international strategic environment upsetting the bal-
ance of power that was shaped after the end of the Second World War. The 
unfruitful Moscow conference, on April 1947 for the accommodation of the 
German problem and the Prague coup d’ etat, on February 1948, exacerbated 
Western Europe’s concerns for a potential Soviet military intervention. These 
concerns promoted the level of communication among the states of Western 
Europe and formulated the preconditions for a different stance towards Ger-
many. The need for the conclusion of a defense agreement that would corre-
spond to the developing situation, determined the drift of events. However, 
                                                        
1
 A detailed analysis on the functionalist theory is beyond the scope of this study. Let 
it be noted here, that based on this theory, through the unification of basic fields of 
operations of the national states in gradual steps, and with the end state being the 
creation of a supranational community, groups of people or politically acting indi-
viduals could transfer their initial interest or the focus of the initial centre to a new 
one “the institutions of which already posses or claim competence and authority over 
the pre-existing national states”. The fundamental motive for such a move would be 
the pursuit of their interest and the increase of their prosperity.  
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Germany’s participation in a defense treaty was viewed problematic at that 
time, as it stumbled upon the reaction of the Western European states, which 
were not yet ready to turn the page to the recent past and the tragic memories 
of the Second World War.  
3. The Treaty of Brussels, 1948 
In this context, Germany was not invited to participate in the consulta-
tions preceding the Brussels Treaty, which was signed under the initiative of 
Great Britain, on March 17, 1948 (Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense, 
 http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b480317a.htm The Treaty was put 
into force on August 25, 1948). According, however, to a provision of the 
latter treaty, which succeeded the Dunkerk Agreement, other states that were 
not signatory parties, were also allowed to accede as members in the future 
(Christodoulides, 2001).2 It was evident that this was a clear hint, directed 
towards Germany and Italy. The opportune climate that was gradually 
formulating, was reinforced by the Soviet threat that was steadily growing, 
altering the field of international relations to a bipolar one (East-West). At 
that time, the Korean War was imminent and the Western European states 
were already in a position of dependence from the US, as far as security was 
concerned. The latter having undertaken the burden of the defense of West-
ern Europe, and regarding a Soviet offensive against Western Germany quite 
likely, pressed for the immediate rearmament of Germany. It was mainly 
France, which expressed reaction towards those pressures. This problem was 
quite hard to resolve. Germany, had to enter the western camp at any cost, in 
a manner that would not cause reactions to other states, and especially 
France. 
4. A failed attempt: the European Defense Community (EDC), 1952 
It was fate’s play that it was France, which opened the door of Western 
Europe to Germany. On May 9, 1950 the French Foreign Minister, Robert 
Schuman, addressed a proposal to six European states, among which West 
Germany and Italy were included, for the creation of a supranational –and 
                                                        
2
 Due to the extended participation in the Treaty of Brussels (the BENELUX states 
were also participating), a broader security perspective was created that overcompen-
sated for the feared rebirth of the German threat. This is because the system of mu-
tual guarantees, that was envisaged in the Treaty, was not to be activated only in the 
case of the German threat –even though it was the only one mentioned in the pream-
ble.  
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not intergovernmental- European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). It is 
noteworthy, that the supranational nature of the Community as opposed to an 
intergovernmental one, means that the states that are involved in it, cede to 
the Community a part of their national sovereignty on issues that are dealt by 
the Community. Thus, hereafter, the Community and it alone, was competent 
for the regulation of the issues that the member states had agreed to cede to 
it. 
In this sense, the establishment of the ECSC, on a supranational level, 
aimed at the creation of a common market in which coal and steel, the fun-
damental raw material for Europe’s reconstruction after the Second World 
War, would circulate freely. The supranational nature would prevent any 
antagonisms among the member states of the ECSC and would contribute to 
their indispensable reconciliation. In particular, the reconciliation between 
France and Germany, which worked to the interest of the former state in the 
sense that it would tame the potential economic despotism of the latter. The 
reconciliation, however, “was to the interest of Germany as well, in the sense 
that it would reinstate the respect and trust of the international community 
[towards it]” (Stephanou, 1999). It is worth pointing out, that the French For-
eign Minister, who is considered as the inspirer of ECSC plan –along with 
Jean Monnet- addressed his proposal to all European states out of which only 
five approved of it, namely Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Italy, the Netherlands and Luxemburg. 
The positive dynamics for integration that the ECSC created, inspired the 
French prime minister, Rene Pleven (Kouskouvelis, 1995), to move forward 
with the proposal of a draft treaty, which would in the end lead to the crea-
tion of a European army. A series of events has contributed to the proposal of 
such a plan. On the one hand it was the Korean War, which as of June 1950 
had already started, plus the fact that the US due to their engagement, 
pressed this time more than any other for the immediate rearmament of Ger-
many. On the other hand, the Pleven plan could function in a catalytic man-
ner for the reactions expressed by France and Great Britain, as this plan, let 
alone the ECSC, had a supranational nature and in this sense it would deprive 
Germany of the authority to rearm itself. It is well expressed that, instead “of 
the German rearmament, the Germans could rearm in the framework of a 
new European community”, a supranational defense community (Christo-
doulides, 2001, 39). 
The European Defense Community (EDC), however, the fruit of 
Pleven’s plan failed. The initial signatures of Germany and Italy, on May 27, 
1952, were not followed by those of Great Britain and later France, which 
followed Britain’s example. As it was mentioned in the French parliament, 
on August 30, 1954, it was impossible for a defense agreement to provide 
any sense of security to Europe if Germany would participate but Britain 
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would abstain (Naskou-Perraki, 2002, 285). Professor Christodoulides elo-
quently comments on EDC’s unfortunate course: “the moribund attempt of 
agglomeration in the field of defense had walked its short path. The people of 
Europe had to wait four full decades for a new historical challenge in order to 
repeat this venture, losing the supranational cloak, in a minor institutional 
and substantial expression” (Christodoulides, 2001, 41). 
5. The establishment of the WEU, 1954. 
In September 1954, Britain tried to promote the idea of the European in-
tegration through the framework of the Atlantic Treaty (NATO), without 
excluding Germany this time. One month later, in October 1954, the Brussels 
Treaty was amended, four new supplementary protocols were signed in Paris 
(the Paris Protocols)3 and the WEU was established.4 The Supplementary 
Protocols were put into force on May 6, 1955 and referred to the financial, 
social and defense cooperation of the members, the enlargement by two new 
members (Germany and Italy)5, the military forces of the new Organisation6 
                                                        
3
 See Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty, Protocol No. II on 
Forces of Western European Union, Protocol No. III on the Control of Armaments, 
Protocol No. IV on the Agency of Western European Union for the Control of Ar-
maments. For the text of the Protocols see Ministry of Foreign  Affairs, The Western 
European Union. Fifty Years from the Brussels Treaty (1948-1998), Athens, 1999, 
pp. 84-131 (hereafter Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 
4
 Western European Union, Union de l’Europe Occidentale, www.weu.int The Brus-
sels Treaty of 1948, revised through the Paris Protocols, will be mentioned as Re-
vised Treaty. For texts see K. Ioannou & G. Koumoutsakou, op. cit. Appendix, pp. 
55-61. 
5
 As far as the enlargement is concerned see the Preamble of the first Protocol, which 
mentions: “Inspired by the common will for the enhancement of peace and security. 
Wishing towards this aim to promote and encourage the gradual unification of 
Europe. Convinced that the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the 
Italian Republic in the Treaty would constitute a new substantial progress towards 
the fulfilment of the aforementioned aims…” in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op. cit., 
pp. 84-85. See also the Declaration Inviting Italy and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many to Accede to the Brussels Treaty, which was adopted in parallel to the Paris 
Protocols. 
6
 See article 1 of Protocol II which refers to the administration of the military forces: 
“The ground and air forces, which each of the High Signatory Parties would place 
under the orders of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe, in times 
of peace, will not exceed in total force and number of units…” in Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, op. cit., p. 92. 
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and the control of armaments through the WEU Agency for the Control of 
Armaments.7 
According to E. Kouskouvelis’ approach, the WEU finds the ideological 
support for its establishment and the definition of the role it was called upon 
to play, within the frame of mind that the Western European states should 
coalesce against the Soviet or German threat. He specifically mentions: “the 
ulterior aim of the WEU’s existence was the functioning of NATO in Europe 
and a presupposition for that functioning was the rearmament and the incor-
poration of Germany within its framework. In order, however, to ease reac-
tions by France and the United Kingdom, Germany would be incorporated in 
the WEU, in parallel with NATO, through which the German rearmament 
would be checked. The German accession, nevertheless, had as a natural im-
plication the abolition of one of the fundamental aims of the Brussels Treaty: 
that of defense against any threat, expressly including the resurgence of the 
German aggressive policies” ( Kouskouvelis, 1995, 90)8 
During the three first decades following its establishment, the WEU 
functioned more as a forum for discussion among the European states rather 
than a military arm. It promoted the European integration and forged the 
Great Britain-Europe relation. In this dire international environment, the 
WEU acted as a bridge between the Western European states and the United 
Kingdom, contributing immensely both in the course of European integration 
as well as in the accession of the latter in the European family –the then 
EEC- in 1973. The WEU clearly constitutes the cradle for the birth of the 
European idea and surely, the protective arm that salvaged it, in difficult 
times for the communication among the peoples of Europe. It served as the 
minimum necessary capital the investment of which was bound to bear future 
profit.  
6. The reactivation of the WEU: from the Hague, to Maasticht and Am-
sterdam 
The reactivation of the WEU occurred essentially on October 1987, dur-
ing the WEU Council Summit in the Hague, with the adoption of a text, 
which at a practical level promoted the European cooperation in the field of 
armaments, their control and their non-proliferation, while in parallel it rein-
forced NATO’s European arm. Under the title “Platform on European Secu-
                                                        
7
 See Protocols III and IV in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op. cit., pp. 96 and 104 re-
spectively. 
8
 See also the Preamble and article VII par. B of the Revised Treaty. 
European Research Studies, Volume IX, Issue (1-2), 2006 
 
 
120
rity Interests”, also known as the Hague Platform, this text signaled also the 
accession of three new states in the WEU: Spain, Portugal and Greece.9 
The Maastricht Treaty was the next landmark in the course of the WEU 
evolution, in the sense that the WEU undertook a series of important activi-
ties having to do with the security within the framework of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). On this basis, on December 10, 1991, 
the leaders of the WEU member states adopted the Statement on the WEU 
role and on its Relation with the Atlantic Alliance, and a Statement on 
WEU’s enlargement, both of which constituted Annex V of the Maastricht 
European Council Presidency Conclusions.10 Furthermore, the field of the 
WEU’s competences and especially the Council were broadened in such a 
manner that would allow the concerted action of the WEU, the EU and the 
CFSP, as far as security is concerned (Powner, 2000, 10).  The second state-
ment recognized the need to develop a European Security and Defense Iden-
tity (ESDI), which would hereafter connect the EU and NATO, as the mili-
tary arm of the former and the European pillar of the latter and would pro-
mote at the same time the evolution of the WEU as far as its operational role 
is concerned. 
This Statement signaled the accession of Greece in the WEU, which, 
nevertheless, did not confirm Greece’s initial optimism. The mutual assis-
tance clause of article V of the WEU, which could strengthen Greece’s secu-
rity against Turkey, proved ineffective because of Turkey’s accession and 
second because of the redrafting of the clause by the WEU member states. 
From that point onwards, the clause did not cover a WEU member state in 
the case that it engaged with a NATO member state. Obviously, Turkey is a 
NATO member state and the ‘innuendo’ targeted Greece. 
The Petersburg Declaration of June 19, 1992 during the WEU Council 
Bonn Summit reaffirmed WEU’s support on conflict prevention, crisis man-
agement and the efforts to maintain peace at a regional level in cooperation 
with the OSCE, UN Security Council, along the lines of the Helsinki Final 
Act. However, the Maastricht Treaty, despite the important steps it took in 
the field of the promotion of European integration and the field of defense 
                                                        
9
 The accession Protocols for the first two countries were signed on November 1988, 
while Greece’s on November 1992. Portugal and Spain entered the alliance on March 
1990, while Greece in 1995. 
10
 The first Statement, among others, mentioned the following: “the WEU member 
states agree to the need of developing a genuine defense identity, as far as security 
and defense are concerned and to undertake a greater European responsibility on 
defense issues… The WEU will constitute an indispensable part of the development 
of the European Union and will strengthen its contribution in the solidarity of the 
Atlantic Alliance members…”. See K. Ioannou & G. Koumoutsakou, op. cit. Appen-
dix, pp. 59-61. 
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and security11, did not manage to give a convincing answer to many issues 
concerning security, regardless of the fact that it addressed them, including 
the common defense policy.12 The adoption, for example, of article V of the 
WEU, which would lead to the incorporation, or in particular the “merge” 
between the EU and the WEU, providing at the same time defense capabili-
ties to the EU, did not materialize (Lamprides and Yfantis, 2003,  589). 
The next treaty was the Amsterdam Treaty, which was signed in June 
1996 so as to revise the Maastricht Treaty and promote the role of the WEU 
as the EU’s basic defense pillar. This promotion had to do with the develop-
ment of a common defense policy in the areas of crisis prevention and man-
agement (Duke, 2000, 585, Ioakeimides, 2001, 586). Yet, this time the WEU 
was put under the European Council’s “guidance”13 while, for the first time 
the issue of the “potential incorporation of the WEU to the EU was put on 
the table, since the European Council was the one to decide on the matter”. It 
is true that this last clause signaled and foretold WEU’s future. As it is aptly 
noted, the fact that the Amsterdam Treaty transferred the responsibility for 
any military operation directly to the EU, rendered the WEU “without sub-
ject matter” and proved “its existence without meaning” (Ioakeimides, 593). 
The countdown for the WEU had just begun. By June 1999, the Cologne 
European Council decided the establishment of the Defense Policy Commis-
sion, a Military Commission and the transfer of specific competences and 
organs from the WEU. It was also stated, that the WEU will have accom-
plished its mission with the promotion of the procedure of deepening in the 
field of defense. The appointment of the Secretary General of the EU Coun-
cil as Secretary General of the WEU, on November 1999, signaled an irre-
versible course of WEU’s incorporation to the EU. 
March 1, 2000 was the day when the Secretariat of the WEU council, the 
Political and Security Commission, and the Interim Military Body operated 
in Brussels.14 The commission in question was incorporated during the Nice 
European Council, on December 2001, in the Nice Treaty (Ioakeimides, 
2001, 593), which also amended article 25 of the EU Treaty, deleting any 
reference to the EU-WEU relations. The result was that the EU also consti-
                                                        
11
 See Title V of the Treaty. 
12
 See article J.4.1 of the Treaty. 
13
 It is worth pointing out that this particular development had caused the strong reac-
tion of the USA in the past. On this issue see more in P. Ioakeimides, European Po-
litical Union, Theory, Negotiations, Institutions and Policies, The Maastricht Treaty 
and Greece, Themelio, 1993, pp. 266-267.   
14
 Let it be noted that the suspension of the WEU activities was decided by the WEU 
Council on the November 2000 Marseilles Summit, in which the Ministers of De-
fense and Foreign Affairs of the member states participated. 
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tuted from then on a “military institution”, while the WEU “a legal entity 
with no substantial authority” (Ioakeimides, 2001, 592). 
7. Conclusion 
The WEU never functioned in accordance to the intensity or the broad-
ness of the authorities and the aims for which it was created. Nevertheless, as 
the forces of history worked their way, the WEU played a role of no lesser 
importance. It functioned as a basis for the European edifice of the future, it 
bridged differences that historically existed among the European states and in 
short, it educated its European audience to think in many cases in a mutually 
supranational manner. The CFSP stemmed from the WEU, as a more sophis-
ticated model for communication-cooperation on issues of foreign and de-
fense policy. It was responsible for the structuring of institutional arsenal, 
spheres of responsibility, procedures for the easing off of disputes and crea-
tion of consent. According to this frame of thought the WEU functioned as 
the archetype on which the EU was based and it contributed effectively to the 
historical course, supporting on varying levels of cooperation and actions in 
an effective manner the very cause of European integration. 
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